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ERNEST A. YOUNG* 
Public-minded people might usefully be lumped into two 
categories: those who seek ways to make things better, and those who 
mostly worry that things could get worse. Professor Jason Mazzone, 
whose paper proposes that the American people should vote every two 
decades on whether to have a constitutional convention,1 is plainly one 
of the first kind of people—it’s one of the many things that make him 
so likeable and engaging. It will quickly become apparent that I’m the 
other kind, which is why one of my teachers memorably called me a 
grumpy, old man when I was just nineteen years old. 
These two temperamental dispositions track two ways of thinking 
about constitutions. One is as a spur to social improvement. Especially 
in the modern era, constitutions serve as a repository for a society’s 
basic values and commitments,2 and as such they may inspire social 
movements to press for reform of institutions and practices that may 
be inconsistent with those values. And because constitutions 
“constitute” a government by creating institutions and procedures for 
transmitting the popular will into law,3 they provide the mechanisms 
through which necessary reforms can be identified, agreed upon, and 
implemented. 
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 1.  Jason Mazzone, Amending the Amendment Procedures of Article V, 13 DUKE J. CONST. 
L. & PUB. POL’Y 115, 115 (2018). 
 2.  See, e.g., Joseph Raz, On the Authority and Interpretation of Constitutions: Some 
Preliminaries, in CONSTITUTIONALISM: PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS 152, 153–54 (Larry 
Alexander ed., 1998). 
 3.  See id.; see also Ernest A. Young, The Constitution Outside the Constitution, 177 YALE 
L.J. 408, 417–22 (2007). 
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The other way of thinking sees a constitution as a shield against 
undesirable change—as a bulwark against chaos. This vision focuses on 
an additional function of constitutions, which is the entrenchment of 
certain rights, institutions, and principles against change through 
ordinary legal processes.4 The postwar German constitution, for 
example, purports to make its commitment to democracy unamendable 
in case that nation is ever tempted to bring back fascism.5 Likewise, the 
core function of our First Amendment is to make sure that even in a 
period of great suspicion of dissent—like the Red Scare in the late 
1940s and early 1950s, for example—we don’t round up people of 
different views and lock them away.6 Constitutions are conservative 
documents in this sense: They protect our foundational institutions and 
commitments from change. 
This conservative perspective on constitutionalism is importantly 
distinct from the usual understanding of “conservative” in 
contemporary political debates.7 The Republican party, for example, 
played a conservative role in the sense I mean it here by resisting 
sweeping attempts to overhaul the healthcare system, but there would 
be little conservatism in abolishing well-established government 
agencies, privatizing Social Security, or amending the Constitution to 
allow punishment of flag-burners. Conservatism as resistance to change 
is often associated with the British statesman Edmund Burke. Because 
Burkean conservatism focuses on the pace of change, it need not—and 
often does not—correlate with ideologies based on a particular 
conception of the good life.8 The old guard communists who resisted 
Mikhail Gorbachev’s radical reforms were conservative in this sense 
because they sought to maintain an established political and economic 
 
 4.  This is not a necessary function of constitutions. The British Constitution has, with only 
the most modest (and controversial) qualifications, been thought to be subject to Parliament’s 
sovereign power to make or unmake any law. See, e.g., A.V. DICEY, INTRODUCTION TO THE 
STUDY OF THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION 3 (Liberty Classics 1982) (1885).  
 5.  See generally Ulrich K. Preuss, The Implications of “Eternity Clauses”: The German 
Experience, 44 ISR. L. REV. 429 (2011) (discussing the validity of an unamendable clause in the 
German Constitution). 
 6.  See generally Vincent Blasi, The Pathological Perspective and the First Amendment, 85 
COLUM. L. REV. 449 (1985) (“{T]he overriding objective . . . should be to equip the first 
amendment to do maximum service in those historical periods when intolerance of unorthodox 
ideas is most prevalent . . . .”). 
 7.  See generally Samuel P. Huntington, Conservatism as an Ideology, 51 AM. POL. SCI. 
REV. 454 (1957); Ernest A. Young, Judicial Activism and Conservative Politics, 73 U. COLO. L. 
REV. 1139, 1182–1203 (2002). 
 8.  See Huntington, supra note 7, at 467–68 (distinguishing “situational” from “ideational” 
forms of conservatism). 
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order, even though communism is generally associated with radical 
change. 
Burkean conservatism arises out of the view that human reason is 
inherently limited.9 No statesman, no matter how brilliant, can fully 
anticipate the results of even the best-intentioned reforms, and so we 
are well-advised to proceed incrementally and with great caution.10 
Here is Burke on the foolhardiness of monkeying around with the basic 
structure of a political constitution: 
An ignorant man, who is not fool enough to meddle with his clock, 
is however sufficiently confident to think he can safely take to 
pieces, and put together at his pleasure, a moral machine of another 
guise importance and complexity, composed of far other wheels, and 
springs, and balances, and counteracting and co-operating powers.11 
This is not to say that Burkeans would never support political or social 
change. Burke himself was one of the great reformers of his age. He 
was a Whig, not a Tory, and he fought in Parliament for reform in 
Ireland, India, and the American colonies.12 Such reform must be 
careful to build on tradition and prescriptive wisdom, however. Above 
all, present-day reformers have no right to re-shape the state in their 
own image—to act, as Burke put it, as if they were the entire masters” 
of the State,  
unmindful of what they have received from their ancestors or of 
what is due to their posterity . . . . By this unprincipled facility of 
changing the state as often, and as much, and in as many ways as 
there are floating fancies or fashions, the whole chain and continuity 
of the commonwealth would be broken.13 
Sometimes conservatives like the late, great Justice Antonin Scalia, 
talk as if holding onto fundamental principles until they’re pried from 
 
 9.  See generally Ernest A. Young, Rediscovering Conservatism: Burkean Political Theory 
and Constitutional Interpretation, 72 N.C. L. REV. 619, 644–47 (1994); see also J.G.A. Pocock, 
Burke and the Ancient Constitution—A Problem in the History of Ideas, in POLITICS, LANGUAGE 
AND TIME: ESSAYS ON POLITICAL THOUGHT AND HISTORY 202, 203 (1971) (observing that 
“Burke’s thought can . . . properly be set in opposition to any rationalist system of politics”). 
 10.  See, e.g., Edmund Burke, Reflections on the Revolution in France, in 8 THE WRITINGS 
AND SPEECHES OF EDMUND BURKE 112, 217 (Paul Langford ed., 1989) (1791); Young, supra note 
9, at 654–56. 
 11.  Edmund Burke, An Appeal from the New to the Old Whigs, in 4 THE WRITINGS AND 
SPEECHES OF EDMUND BURKE 365, 472 (P.J. Marshall & Donald C. Bryant eds., 2015) (1791).  
 12.  See generally CONOR CRUISE O’BRIEN, THE GREAT MELODY: A THEMATIC 
BIOGRAPHY OF EDMUND BURKE (1994); see also Young, supra note 9, at 653–54. 
 13.  Edmund Burke, Reflections on the Revolution in France, in 2 THE WRITINGS AND 
SPEECHES OF EDMUND BURKE 1, 112 (E.J. Payne ed., 1888) (1791). 
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our cold, dead fingers is the only thing constitutions do.14  That’s not 
true. As I’ve already suggested, constitutions may spur and facilitate 
change by holding up aspirational values and providing institutional 
frameworks for reform. But Scalia was right to suggest that when the 
content of the Constitution itself becomes open to change, that may 
undermine the Constitution’s ability to preserve our most foundational 
commitments when circumstances arise that make those commitments 
unpopular.15 That is true whether we are talking about modes of 
constitutional interpretation—such as the debate between originalism 
and living constitutionalism—or altering the process of amendment. 
Now one possible answer to all this is that Professor Mazzone is not 
necessarily advocating more frequent amendments to the Constitution. 
His proposal is simply that the sovereign People should be asked, every 
so often, whether they would like to have a constitutional convention 
to consider amendments. Mazzone does not necessarily think that we 
should actually have many such conventions, much less that they should 
adopt a great many amendments. The point is simply to prompt 
democratic deliberation about the desirability of amendment, rather 
than unthinking attachment to the current version. It is regrettable, to 
Mazzone, that “[l]arge portions of the American public (and their 
leaders) view the Constitution in sacred terms such that amending it is 
akin to sacrilege and even talk of amendment raises suspicions  of 
treachery.”16 “By asking citizens to consider periodically whether the 
Constitution currently serves them well or should be reformed,” 
Mazzone writes, “the proposed amendment encourages the spread of 
information about the Constitution and provides an occasion for 
conversation and debate around its provisions.”17 
Fair enough. But it is nonetheless fair to construe Professor 
Mazzone’s proposal as joining issue on the desirability of amendment 
in general for two reasons.18 The first is that the proposal may well lead 
to considerably more amendments than are likely under the current 
version of Article V. One of the principal obstacles to any potential 
amendment—much less to a constitutional convention—is getting it on 
the national agenda. When Texas Governor Greg Abbott proposed a 
 
 14.  See, e.g., Scalia Vigorously Defends a ‘Dead’ Constitution, NAT’L PUB. RADIO, Apr. 28, 
2008, https://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=90011526. 
 15.  See id. 
 16.  Mazzone, supra note 1, at 118. 
 17.  Id. at 125. 
 18.  Moreover, the desirability of amendment is an implicit premise of this entire conference, 
which tasked each invitee to offer a proposal for amendment. 
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constitutional convention of the states in 2016, few took the proposal 
as anything more than political grandstanding.19 The institutional 
barriers to a convention posed by Article V, which requires at least 
thirty-four states to call for a convention, are so daunting that we have 
never had one. Mazzone’s proposal would guarantee a constitutional 
convention a spot on the agenda every twenty years, and a majority 
vote would be sufficient to hold one.20 The proposal would thus 
profoundly shift the burden of overcoming inertia in favor of holding 
constitutional conventions. 
Second, and equally important, the very idea that a national 
“conversation” about the desirability of the Constitution would be a 
good and salutary thing is antithetical to the sort of conservative 
constitutionalism I am espousing here. To be honest, Professor 
Mazzone’s suggestion that Americans should get together every twenty 
years ago and deliberate about whether our existing institutional 
arrangements are good and worthy of continuance makes me wish that 
this conference’s organizers had provided something considerably 
stronger than bottled water to drink. I tend to agree with James 
Madison that relatively unreflective loyalty to the Constitution is a 
feature, not a bug in our system. And I share his worry that “as every 
appeal to the people would carry an implication of some defect in the 
government, frequent appeals would in great measure deprive the 
government of that veneration, which time bestows on every thing, and 
without which perhaps the wisest and freest governments would not 
possess the requisite stability.”21 
We live, moreover, in a time of extreme political polarization, in 
which both sides have strong incentives to pander to their bases and 
avoid compromise even on issues on which they might, in other 
circumstances, readily agree.22 The notion of a “loyal opposition,” so 
vital to a well-functioning democracy, has virtually evaporated under 
 
 19.  See GREG ABBOTT, RESTORING THE RULE OF LAW WITH STATES LEADING THE WAY 
4 (2016), https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/2680556-Abbott-Constitutional-
Proposals.html. 
 20.  Professor Mazzone’s proposal actually requires a double majority: a convention would 
have to be approved by majority vote in a majority of the states, and by a majority of the national 
vote as a whole. See Mazzone, supra note 1, at 121–22. Whether the latter addition would make 
much difference in practice is an open question. 
 21.  THE FEDERALIST NO. 49 (James Madison). 
 22.  See generally RONALD BROWNSTEIN, THE SECOND CIVIL WAR: HOW EXTREME 
PARTISANSHIP HAS PARALYZED WASHINGTON AND POLARIZED AMERICA (2007); MARC J. 
HETHERINGTON & THOMAS J. RUDOLPH, WHY WASHINGTON WON’T WORK: POLARIZATION, 
POLITICAL TRUST, AND THE GOVERNING CRISIS (2015).  
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both the Trump and Obama administrations. California has placed 
secession on the ballot and imposed a travel ban on publicly-funded 
travel to other states that it finds morally unsound. “Unthinking 
attachment” to the Constitution may be the last of the common ground 
that we have left. And encouraging highly partisan Americans to think 
hard about whether they really like the Constitution seems likely to 
undermine that last redoubt of common commitment. In this 
environment, my own impulse is to cling to the established Constitution 
as the only rock likely to last us through the storm. It is a singularly odd 
time to contemplate throwing open the doors to far-reaching 
institutional change. 
In this regard, the most troubling line in Professor Mazzone’s paper 
is his suggestion that “[g]iving citizens an opportunity to affirm the 
Constitution in its existing form or proceed to a convention will mean 
also the Constitution is no longer the product of past generations: it 
becomes instead the work of the living.”23 To be honest, I’m not at all 
sure I want the living anywhere near my Constitution. After all, the 
living gave us Donald Trump, Bernie Sanders, and Justin Bieber. More 
seriously, it’s not clear how much respect the living have for many of 
the constitutional values that I hold dear. For instance, survey data 
suggests that the millennial generation is far more willing than prior 
generations to limit offensive speech in ways that would plainly violate 
the First Amendment.24 Much of the point of a constitution is to ensure 
that the vitality of principles like free speech do not fluctuate with the 
ebb and flow of popular opinion. I much prefer sticking with the 
opinions of the dead, as enshrined in our founding document. 
Professor Mazzone does have one very fair rejoinder to all this, 
which is to suggest that the real choice is not between constitutional 
change and constitutional stasis, but rather between different modes of 
change. He observes, with much justification, that “while Article V’s 
procedures have been shut off, the Constitution has not stagnated. 
Instead, with textual amendments foreclosed, courts have gained 
power to adopt, in the name of constitutional interpretation, reforms 
they themselves view to be desirable.”25 It seems likely that political 
 
 23.  Mazzone, supra note 1, at 125. 
 24.  Compare Jacob Poushter, 40% of Millennials OK with Limiting Speech Offensive to 
Minorities, PEW RESEARCH CTR. (Nov. 20, 2015), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-
tank/2015/11/20/40-of-millennials-ok-with-limiting-speech-offensive-to-minorities/, with R.A.V. 
v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992) (striking down St. Paul’s ordinance prohibiting certain 
forms of hate speech). 
 25.  Mazzone, supra note 1, at 118–19. Professor Mazzone’s priors are evident in his use of 
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systems do inevitably give rise to a certain amount of pressure for 
change and reform, and that if efforts to amend the founding charter 
are stymied, pressures for change will, in hydraulic fashion, find some 
other outlet. And Mazzone is also right that this outlet has often been 
the courts. 
It is hardly obvious, however, that at least some degree of judge-
driven change is undesirable. Judicial change is generally—if not 
always—incremental, being limited by the norm that courts should only 
decide those issues necessary to resolve the dispute before them. And 
it is both retrospective and grounded in the particular factual 
circumstances of individual cases. Courts do not decide the meaning of 
individual rights, for example, in the abstract, but rather in concrete 
factual settings where the impact of those rights on competing values 
can be more readily gauged.26 And as Barry Friedman has shown, the 
courts are hardly unresponsive to democratic opinion over time27—
albeit usually with a lag that may, from a conservative perspective, be 
salutary. 
One can exaggerate, moreover, the extent to which the alternative 
to textual amendment is simply judicial activism. Many, if not most, of 
the most fundamental changes in our institutional arrangements over 
the past two and a quarter centuries have been effected neither by 
textual amendments nor judicial pronouncements. Consider, for 
example: 
• the acquisition of the vast majority of U.S. territory; 
• the development of the administrative and regulatory state; 
• the creation of an important range of financial institutions 
designed to solidify the government’s finances and regulate the 
economy, beginning with the Bank of the United States and 
leading up to the FDIC, the FSLC, and the Federal Reserve; 
• the establishment of broad rights to income security in old age, 
access to healthcare, and a clean environment; and 
 
the term “stagnated” as a synonym for “remained unchanged.” Whether the absence of change is 
“stagnation” or something rather more attractive, like “endurance,” of course depends on 
whether the initial conditions were good or bad—and on whether changes in those conditions are 
more likely to make them better or worse. 
 26.  See, e.g., ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME 
COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 25–26 (1982); Young, supra note 9, at 680–81. 
 27.  See generally BARRY FRIEDMAN, THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE: HOW PUBLIC OPINION 
HAS INFLUENCED THE SUPREME COURT AND SHAPED THE MEANING OF THE CONSTITUTION 
(2009). 
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• in foreign affairs, the negotiation of broad treaties creating 
powerful alliances, recognizing human rights, and imposing 
regulatory standards, and the development of extensive 
institutional bodies to implement, interpret, and enforce these 
provisions. 
In each of these instances, the changes were not clearly provided for or 
contemplated in the Constitution. And neither were these changes 
effected by courts. In some cases, the courts issued decisions—either 
right away or belatedly—declining to get in the way, but that is hardly 
the same thing as saying that the change was effected by judicial 
decision. In McCulloch v. Maryland,28 for example, the Court approved 
the creation of the Bank of the United States and set a precedent for 
creating powerful successor institutions like the Federal Reserve that 
profoundly shape our current life. But McCulloch neither mandated 
the Bank nor removed some obvious constitutional impediment that, 
prior to the Court’s action, would have foreclosed it. The Court simply 
confirmed that whether to take this step was up to Congress. 
All of the changes noted above are “constitutional” in the sense 
that they are important changes to our basic institutional arrangements. 
As such they implicate the “constitutive” function of constitutions.29  
But our constitutional document takes no position on whether there 
should be a Bank of the United States, a Federal Reserve, or similar 
institutions. It neither explicitly authorizes nor forbids the acquisition 
of new territory. As I have argued in much greater detail elsewhere, the 
great majority of institutional change over our history has not occurred 
through textual amendment or through judicial interpretation; rather, 
it is made possible by the sheer number of questions on which the 
Constitution entrenches no particular answer.30 One can thus recognize 
that some change in our basic institutional arrangements is both 
necessary and inevitable without embracing either judicial activism or 
easier textual amendment. 
If anything, the problem we’re having is not that it’s too hard to 
amend the Constitution; it’s that under circumstances of partisan 
gridlock, we can’t manage to amend statutes. We can’t amend Social 
Security or any of the other entitlement programs in order to put them 
on a sound financial footing. We can’t amend the immigration laws to 
either toughen them up or grant a path to citizenship for people who 
 
 28.  17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819). 
 29.  See Raz, supra note 2, at 153–54; Young, supra note 3, at 417–22. 
 30.  See Young, supra note 3, at 455–59. 
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came here illegally. And because we can’t pass or amend statutes, we 
have massive fights about executive power because the President tries 
to do everything unilaterally with his pen and his phone.31 
Professor Mazzone might respond that that’s why we need to make 
it easier to amend the Constitution: so that we can amend the national 
lawmaking process and make it easier to change federal laws. But the 
roots of our governance crisis are in pathologies of American politics—
the polarization of national politics and its elimination of incentives for 
compromise—not in the unamendable Constitution. Even where 
politicians take shortcuts to lawmaking, such as President Obama’s 
executive actions on climate and immigration, the swings in control of 
the executive branch that characterize a 50-50 nation mean that those 
actions will often be reversed from one administration to the next. In 
any event, I want to address a more fundamental point, which is that 
even if Mazzone did succeed in establishing a more fluid process of 
political change, he is entirely too sanguine in thinking that this would 
most likely be a good thing. 
Opponents of constitutional conventions have long warned about 
“runaway” conventions that might threaten our basic liberties.32 
Professor Mazzone’s doesn’t say much to calm these fears; mostly, he 
stresses that any amendment coming out of a convention—runaway or 
otherwise—would still have to overcome the super-majority 
requirements for adoption of resulting amendments.33 That is certainly 
true, and it’s why I doubt that even if a convention were called it could 
overcome the pathologies of American politics that produce gridlock 
in our other institutions. But in that case the proposed amendment to 
Article V wouldn’t achieve any of its proponents’ aims. 
If we are to adopt an amendment making it easier to call 
conventions, however, it seems fair to ask whether such conventions 
would produce good amendments or bad. And so a real answer to the 
runaway convention point requires some confidence in the convention 
 
 31.  See generally Margaret H. Lemos & Ernest A. Young, State Public Law Litigation in an 
Age of Polarization, __ TEX. L. REV. __, (forthcoming 2018) (describing how executive 
unilateralism tends to result from legislative gridlock under conditions of partisan polarization). 
 32.  See, e.g., Wash. Post Editorial Bd., We’re Surprisingly Close to Our First Constitutional 
Convention Since 1787. Bad Idea., WASH. POST (Apr. 6, 2017), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/were-surprisingly-close-to-a-new-constitutional-
convention-bad-idea/2017/04/06/f6d5b76a-197d-11e7-855e-4824bbb5d748_story.html?utm_term 
=.f906fff477cc; David A. Super, A Constitutional Convention is the Last Thing America Needs, 
L.A. TIMES (Mar. 15, 2017), http://www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la-oe-super-constitutional-
convention-20170315-story.html; see also Mazzone, supra note 1, at 135 (noting this concern). 
 33.  See Mazzone, supra note 1, at 124. 
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participants’ ability to distinguish between them. Professor Mazzone’s 
proposal only makes sense if he thinks that the really valuable aspects 
of our constitutional tradition—such as its protection of our basic 
liberties—have sufficient popular support that they have little to fear 
from a convention. 
Maybe that’s right—I hope it is. But the primary office of this 
response to Professor Mazzone is to offer reasons to worry, and on this 
point I want to suggest two. First, many of our present political 
discontents involve conflicts among basic liberties. Increasing numbers 
of young people now think that free speech rights should give way to 
rights of racial (and perhaps other forms of) equality.34 Many 
progressives seem to think that religious free exercise rights should be 
limited in favor of claims to reproductive choice or sexual autonomy.35 
Partisans these days seem to have little trouble limiting constitutional 
liberties when it is in service of other liberties that they hold more dear. 
Under current conditions, there is no reason for confidence that a 
convention would not propose limitations on important civil liberties. 
The second worry is that even if amendments largely avoided direct 
monkeying with individual rights, they might well still pose a threat to 
liberty. It is probably true that the most likely amendments to come out 
of a convention would focus on the structure of government, rather 
than diluting or repealing individual rights. Amendment hawks tend to 
think that our government processes are dysfunctional, so they often 
want to water down aspects of federalism or separation of powers in 
order to grease the wheels of governance.36 This sort of change worries 
me far more than alterations to particular individual rights provisions. 
That is because our Founders envisioned the constitutional structure as 
providing the primary safeguard for liberty; to framers like Madison 
and Hamilton, the Bill of Rights was a constitutional afterthought.37 
And although our history has proven the benefits of separate and 
explicit protections for particular individual rights, there is no good 
 
 34.  See Poushter, supra note 24. 
 35.  See, e.g., Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2799–801 (2014) 
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (preferring interests in reproductive health to religious free exercise); 
Doug Laycock, The Wedding-Vendor Cases, 41 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 49, 50–52 (2018) 
(describing the progressive view that no exceptions for religious dissenters should be made to 
public accommodations protections for same-sex couples). 
 36.  See, e.g., SANFORD LEVINSON, FRAMED: AMERICA’S 51 CONSTITUTIONS AND THE 
CRISIS OF GOVERNANCE 1–15 (2012) (blaming the structural features of the existing Constitution 
for America’s present governmental dysfunction). 
 37.  See, e.g., Ernest A. Young, Federalism as a Constitutional Principle, 83 U. CIN. L. REV. 
1057, 1059–61 (2015). 
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evidence to suggest that these protections have been as important—
much less that they could substitute for—the structural constraints 
hardwired into the frame of government. The constitution of the Soviet 
Union, after all, had admirable individual rights provisions too.38 And 
because structural provisions in constitutions are so interdependent,39 
it is difficult to predict the systemic effects of seemingly benign changes. 
Our system of federalism and separation of powers is Burke’s clock on 
a vast scale. 
When Governor Abbott made his proposal for a constitutional 
convention, my dear friend Sandy Levinson was unable to resist 
offering his own variant on Burke’s cautions about constitutional clock 
repair. He cautioned that constitutional amendment is like tampering 
with a sweater: “You see a thread loose, and you pull at it, then you 
discover that the whole arm is falling off because things are connected 
to one another.”40 This was an extraordinary statement from Professor 
Levinson, who is possibly the most anti-Burkean sort that I know,41 and 
it underscores the risks inherent in constitutional conventions 
regardless of one’s political predispositions. I can imagine other 
circumstances—a different set of founders, a more circumspect 
contemporary generation—in which one might turn over the 
constitutional structure to the living with more confidence. And I can 
imagine a set of institutional arrangements—the persistence of slavery, 
perhaps, or widespread restrictions on the suffrage—in which radical 
change might be called for. But these are not our circumstances. And 
while I am grateful for the opportunity for thought afforded by 




 38.  See, e.g., 1936 CONSTITUTION OF THE U.S.S.R. (Dec. 5, 1936), ch. X, art. 124 
(guaranteeing “[f]reedom of religious worship”); art. 125 (guaranteeing “freedom of speech” and 
“freedom of the press”); art. 128 (guaranteeing “inviolability of the homes of citizens and privacy 
of correspondence”), https://www.departments.bucknell.edu/russian/const/36cons04 
.html#chap10. 
 39.  Cf. Vicki C. Jackson, Narratives of Federalism: Of Continuities and Comparative 
Constitutional Experience, 51 Duke L.J. 223, 273–74 (2001) (noting that the federalism provisions 
of different constitutional orders often exist as parts of “packages,” and that it can be hard to 
tease out the significance of individual provisions in this context). 
 40.  Quoted in Edgar Walters, In 90-Page Proposal, Abbott Asks States to Amend U.S. 
Constitution, TEX. TRIB. (Jan. 8, 2016), https://www.texastribune.org/2016/01/08/abbott-calls-
states-amend-us-constitution/. 
 41.  Indeed, Professor Levinson has repeatedly called for a constitutional convention 
himself. See, e.g., Levinson, supra note 36, at 391. But even dangerous radicals sometimes come 
to their senses. 
